Posted by Melissa Davis, Stephanie Dooley Nelson, and Connor Bourland
This week, the Supreme Court of Texas will hear arguments on Tuesday and Thursday. You can watch arguments live (or watch the recordings, which are usually posted by the day after argument) here.
Tuesday, September 24
No. 17-0557, Pike, et al. v. Texas EMC Management LLC, et al. — This appeal presents several issues stemming from the breakup of a limited partnership, including whether one of the plaintiffs had standing to pursue its claims; whether the damage awards violate the one-satisfaction rule; whether sufficient evidence supports the damage awards; and whether the court of appeals erred in remanding the case to the trial court for entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from using the plaintiffs’ trade secrets. (Note: Thompson & Knight LLP represents the Respondents in this case.)
No. 19-0970, Office of the Attorney General v. Rodriguez — In this whistleblower case, the court of appeals found legally sufficient evidence of causation based on a retaliatory motive attributed to an intermediate supervisor, whose approval was necessary but not sufficient to result in termination. In its petition, the Attorney General’s Office argued the intermediate supervisor could not be a final decision maker, there was no evidence he acted with retaliatory motive, and that it was entitled to an offset of the front-pay award for years during which Rodriguez failed to look for work. After denial of the original petition, the Attorney’s General’s Office moved for rehearing, focusing on conflicts between the court of appeals’ causation analysis and the Texas Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in Alamo Heights Independent School District v. Clark, 554 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. 2018), a Texas Commission on Human Rights Act case that analyzed but-for causation. The motion for rehearing also argued that courts of appeals lack guidance on who is the final decision-maker who can create liability for an employer and what an employer must show to demonstrate a failure to mitigate damages when a plaintiff stops seeking other employment.
No. 18-0413, Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson — The principal issue in this appeal is whether governmental entities may use no-evidence summary-judgment motions as a vehicle for challenging jurisdiction on governmental-immunity grounds. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a governmental entity could not use a no-evidence summary-judgment motion to defeat jurisdiction because the governmental entity has the initial burden to negate the existence of jurisdictional facts before the plaintiff has a burden to produce evidence raising a fact question on jurisdiction. The second issue in this appeal is whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the Texas Open Meetings Act waived immunity for certain of Swanson’s claims brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Both the State of Texas and a group of associations of various governmental entities filed amicus briefs.
Thursday, September 26
No. 17-0736, Teal Trading & Development LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Property Owners Ass’n — The Court will consider the validity of a non-access easement (a “spite strip”) that separates two contiguous tracts of property owned by the Petitioner in Kerr County. At issue is whether the Respondent property-owners’ association has standing to enforce the easement when the current and former property owners of the association waived the non-access easement; whether the home-owners’ association should be estopped from enforcing the easement; and whether the easement should be declared void on public policy grounds.
No. 18-0386,Gray v. Skelton — The Court will consider whether the Fourth Court of Appeals properly reversed an order dismissing a legal-malpractice claim under Rule 91a. The case concerns an attorney who, after her conviction of forgery was vacated when the will she allegedly forged was admitted to probate, sued her criminal defense attorney for malpractice. The attorney was never exonerated and filed suit in 2016, one year after her conviction was vacated, but nine years after the alleged malpractice. The trial court dismissed the claim under Rule 91a. The Court of Appeals reversed. At issue in this case is (1) whether the Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins rule (which tolls the limitations period on legal malpractice arising out of litigation until all appeals have run) applies with equal force to post-conviction proceedings in the criminal context; and (2) whether the Peeler doctrine (which prohibits legal malpractice claims by convicted criminal defendants until after the defendant has been exonerated) extends “exoneration” to vacated convictions.
No. 18-0486, Erkison v. Renda — The Court will consider whether the Hughes rule extends to legal-malpractice claims that occurred in connection with the prosecution of a claim or defense. On the alleged advice of counsel, a business owner transferred various assets to the business’s creditors when the business owed a $12 million debt to the U.S. Government, which led the Government to file a priority suit against the business owner. Eleven years after the alleged advice (six years after the business owner discovered his injury and one year after the final resolution of the Government’s priority suit), the business owner filed a malpractice claim against the attorney who advised him. The trial court granted summary judgment and the Seventh Court of Appeals reversed. At issue in this case is (1) whether the Hughes rules extends to claims of malpractice in connection with, but not actually arising out of, the prosecution or defense of a claim on behalf of the client; (2) whether there exists a “transactional malpractice” exclusion to the Hughes rule under Texas law (and, if it exists, whether it applies); and (3) whether the discovery rule barred the business owner’s claims because he discovered his injury more than two years prior to bringing suit.